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Abstract
We show how to achieve differential privacy with no or reduced added
noise, based on the empirical noise in the data itself. Unlike previous
works on noiseless privacy, the empirical viewpoint avoids making any
explicit assumptions about the random process generating the data.
1 Introduction
Differential privacy [6] is a general method for statistically querying a database
while guaranteeing that information about individual rows is not exposed. This
is useful to preserve the privacy of individuals, if the rows represent individuals.
In the classical setting, the database is deterministic, and the basic idea is to
add controlled noise (typically Laplacian or Gaussian noise) to the answer before
reporting the results of the statistical query. The size of the noise can be taken
to be the maximum difference between the queries for any pair of databases that
differ by one row, divided by a privacy budget. For multiple private queries on
the same database, privacy budgets are additive. What this guarantees is that
the probability of any set of query results does not change multiplicatively by
more than the privacy budget when individual rows are added or removed.
Unfortunately, the amount of noise that must be added is often very large,
obscuring the desired statistical information. The work of Yitao Duan [4, 5]
and others [2, 7] shows a different way. Instead of posing multiple randomized
queries against a single deterministic database, we can pose a single determin-
istic query against a random database. If the rows are labeled by individual,
this still gives us a probability distribution of answers with and without the
individual, and we can demand differential privacy by asking that the proba-
bility of any particular query result does not change multiplicatively by more
than the privacy budget when any individual’s data is added or removed. Yitao
Duan showed that privacy of sum queries could be ensured under certain spe-
cific statistical assumptions on how the random database was generated (with
independent, identically distributed rows).
1
ar
X
iv
:1
91
0.
12
82
0v
2 
 [c
s.L
G]
  3
1 O
ct 
20
19
2 Empirical Approach
In the present work, we instead take an empirical approach. We assume that
there is a whole sequence of databases (for example, a time series of databases),
against each of which we will make a (for now) single deterministic statistical
query. The sequence of databases represents an empirical sample from a hypoth-
esized probability distribution of databases. From this sequence of databases, we
can thereby produce an empirical sample of values of the statistical query, both
with and without any particular individual’s data. This allows us to test the em-
pirical differential privacy of the query by seeing how the empirical probability
distribution of the answers differs with and without any individual’s data.
Definition 1 Given a set of databases Xt indexed by t, with each row labeled
with an individual i, and a deterministic or randomized query f(X), let P denote
the empirical probability distribution determined by the sample f(Xt) over all t.
Furthermore, if Xti is the same set of databases with the data from individual i
removed, let Pi denote the empirical probability distribution determined by the
sample f(Xti ) over all t. Then we say that f is empirically (ε, δ)-differentially
private based on the given sample iff, for all individuals i, and all sets of potential
query results E,
Pi(E) ≤ exp(ε)P (E) + δ
P (E) ≤ exp(ε)Pi(E) + δ.
To practically implement this definition, rather than having to test the pri-
vacy condition against all possible events E, we can instead reformulate the
condition in terms of the empirical probability density function:
Theorem 1 Let p and pi be the empirical probability densities with and without
individual i, derived from the samples f(Xt) and f(Xti ) (respectively). Then the
statistical query f is empirically (ε, δ)-private if, for all i, the densities p and
pi differ by a factor of at most exp(ε), with the exception of a set on which the
densities exceed that bound by a total of no more than δ.
To prove this claim, let A be the set where the densities differ by less than the
required factor (i.e., p ≤ exp(ε)pi and pi ≤ exp(ε)p), and B be the complement
of A. Then for any set of potential query results E,
Pi(E)− exp(ε)P (E)
=
∫
E
pi(x) dx−
∫
E
exp(ε)p(x) dx
≤
∫
E∩A
exp(ε)p(x) dx+
∫
E∩B
pi(x) dx
−
∫
E∩A
exp(ε)p(x) dx−
∫
E∩B
exp(ε)p(x) dx
≤
∫
E∩B
(pi(x)− exp(ε)p(x))+ dx
2
≤ max
(∫
B
(p(x)− exp(ε)pi(x))+ dx,
∫
B
(pi(x)− exp(ε)p(x))+ dx
)
≤ δ.
The same works with the roles of P and Pi reversed, proving that the empirical
probability distributions obey (ε, δ)-privacy.
Because the above privacy property holds for all events E, empirical differen-
tial privacy is immune to post-processing, just like classical differential privacy:
Theorem 2 Let f be an empirically (ε, δ)-differentially private query. If g is
a deterministic function on the range of f , then g ◦ f is empirically (ε, δ)-
differentially private. If g is a randomized function on the range of f , then
g ◦ f is empirically (ε′, δ′)-differentially private, where (ε′, δ′) exceeds (ε, δ) by
any fixed margin with probability approaching zero as the number of samples
g(f(Xt)) grows.
The proof is the same as in the classical theory [6], except in the randomized
case we are only taking a sample of the values of g, resulting in a probabilistic
privacy bound.
Composition of queries f1 and f2 works differently in the empirical than
the classical setting. If we wish to perform another query f2 on the same
sequence of databases Xt, we must jointly put both queries through the above
privacy validation process, looking at the two-dimensional empirical probability
densities of the joint query f = (f1, f2). Without added noise, it is quite
possible for f1 and f2 to be empirically private, but f = (f1, f2) to precisely
reveal individual information.
Although the Definition 1 shows how to obtain privacy guarantees for de-
terministic queries, it may sometimes still be useful to introduce randomized
queries, as in the classical setting. In particular, if we find that the desired
deterministic query is not empirically private enough, we can add a smaller
amount of noise to the query in the same manner as classical differential pri-
vacy, such that combining samples of this noise with the natural randomness
of the sample sequence of databases, achieves the desired empirical differential
privacy.
Although we do not make any explicit statistical assumptions in this em-
pirical approach, there are two important implicit assumptions on which the
concluded privacy depends:
Independent Databases. To ensure that the empirical probability densities
accurately represent the true underlying distribution, the sequence of
databases should be a sample of independent draws from the hypothet-
ical distribution of databases. No other specific statistical assumptions
about the distribution of the databases, or statistical properties of the
rows within each database, need be made.
A key property of the empirical approach is that statistical assumptions
like this can be empirically tested. For example, one way the independence
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assumption could fail is autocorrelation; nevertheless, we can measure the
autocorrelation of the query results on the sequence of databases. If there
is significant empirical autocorrelation, one possible solution is to locally
aggregate the databases in the sequence, to produce a shorter sequence of
databases on a longer timescale where there is no significant autocorrela-
tion. As another example, in a time series of databases, there could be
secular changes in the distribution. To mitigate this, the empirical privacy
analysis can be performed on a window of the time series wide enough to
provide statistically valid results, but narrow enough to avoid the secular
changes.
Representative Individuals. Since the empirical privacy criterion takes a
maximum over all individuals in the sample population, it is important
that the population contain representative individuals from across the
distribution of individuals.
For example, the work of Yitao Duan [4] makes the explicit assumption
that all individuals are statistically identical, and proves noiseless privacy
of sum queries under that assumption. Our approach does not need such
strict assumptions, but the individuals must still be representative.
3 Adversarial Setting
So far we have assumed that the adversary only has access to the published
value of the statistical query. Classical differential privacy assumes that the
adversary could have access to all of the underlying data except for the one
individual whose privacy we are trying to protect. More typically, there is an
intermediate situation in which the adversary knows some of the data. Moreover,
there may be statistical dependency between the data known to the adversary
and the rest of the unknown data [7].
In the empirical approach, we can handle all of these scenarios in a uni-
form way by looking at empirical conditional probability distributions instead
of absolute distributions.
Definition 2 Given a deterministic or randomized query f(X) and another
query g(X) that reveals information known to an adversary, let P (y|Z) de-
note the empirical conditional probability distribution determined by the sample
yt = f(Xt), over all t, conditional on knowledge g(X) ∈ Z of the adversary
information. Similarly, if Xti is the same set of databases with the data from
individual i removed, let Pi(y|Z) denote the empirical conditional probability
distribution determined by the sample f(Xti ), over all t, conditional on knowl-
edge g(X) ∈ Z of the adversary information. Then we say that f is empirically
(ε, δ)-differentially private with adversary g, based on the given sample, iff, for
all individuals i, all sets of potential query results E, and all sets of potential
adversary information Z,
Pi(E|Z) ≤ exp(ε)P (E|Z) + δ
4
P (E|Z) ≤ exp(ε)Pi(E|Z) + δ.
This calculation generally requires a larger sample of databases Xt because
we are splitting the total data across values of the adversary information. To
help with this, we can practically restrict the Z we test to larger buckets of the
adversary data, at some cost in the accuracy of the privacy metrics. Neverthe-
less, this approach is only practical if the amount of adversarial information is
limited.
For example, one typical way the adversarial setting comes into play is that
even though the data is not public, each individual contributing to the database
knows their own contribution. Thus we need to test differential privacy on the
distributions conditional on each individual’s contribution.
4 Numerical Considerations
There are a variety of methods available to estimate the probability density
from sample data.
The simplest is to sort the sample answers to produce the empirical inverse
cumulative distribution function, and then numerically invert and differentiate
it. To balance bias and variance of the estimate, the numerical differencing
should be taken across approximately the square root of the number of sample
points.
Another popular method is kernel density esimation [10], which for suitable
choices of kernel can yield smoother results.
5 Nomenclature
We are aware of a previous unrelated use of the term “empirical differential
privacy” initiated by Abowd et al. [1, 3]. However, their notion is not “em-
pirical” but Bayesian, and not really a measure of “differential privacy” but a
measure of local sensitivity of the Bayesian posterior distribution to the specific
observational data set used to compute the posterior.
6 Applications
As an application, we look at the Chicago Food Inspections database [8], which
is made available under the Open Database License (ODbL [9]). Specifically, we
will look at the privacy of the monthly inspection failure rate with respect to
individual establishments. (We will pretend for this example that the inspection
results are not public information.)
As a first step, we must eliminate a source of autocorrelation in the data.
When an establishment fails an inspection, it is re-inspected shortly thereafter
and usually passes the followup inspection (or maybe the second re-inspection, if
5
Figure 1: Empirical probability density of the inspection failure rate dropping
the establishment with the biggest δ, compared with the empirical probability
density including all establishments.
necessary). For this reason, we eliminate re-inspections from the data, and only
look at inspections triggered directly by licensing, canvassing, or complaints.
We also eliminate inspections that did not result in a Pass or Fail (for ex-
ample, the establishment was out of business).
Our sequence of databases is then the remaining data sequenced by the
month in which the inspection occurred. This gives us a sample of 117 databases
from the current data. Each establishment is identified in the databases by its
license number. Given that we know little about the shape of the probability
distribution, we use the non-parametric differencing method explained above to
estimate the densities.
With this setup, we find that the monthly failure rate is for example at least
(.03, .009)-private with respect to the establishments. The probability density
dropping the establishment with the biggest δ for that ε is plotted in Figure 1
together with the probability density including all establishments. There are
some differences in the middle of the density that appear to be due to empirical
noise, but also some small systematic differences in the right tail of the density.
The differences due to empirical noise are one reason why we generally have
to allow δ > 0 in applications of empirical differential privacy. If we prefer
smaller δ, we can choose larger ε, and we find that the same data is at least
(.1, .002)-private.
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